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Are maternal reflective functioning
and attachment security associated
with preadolescent mentalization?
Anna Maria Rosso*, Paola Viterbori and Alda M. Scopesi
Department of Education, Unit of Psychology, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
This study investigated the impact of maternal reflective functioning (RF) and attachment
security on children’s mentalization. The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) was
administered to mothers in a sample of 41 mother–preadolescent dyads. AAI transcripts
were rated in terms of the Berkeley AAI System (Main and Goldwyn, 1998) and the
Reflective Functioning Scale (RFS; Fonagy et al., 1998). Preadolescent mentalization
was assessed using a semi-structured interview adapted from O’Connor and Hirsch
(1999) and also by analyzing mental-state talk produced during an autobiographical
interview. Relationships between maternal RF and children’s mentalization were
analyzed, with consideration given to the different RFS markers and references to
positive, negative, and mixed-ambivalent mental states. Children’s mentalization was
positively correlated with the mother’s RF, particularly the mother’s ability to mentalize
negative or mixed-ambivalent mental states. No significant differences in mentalization
were observed between children of secure and insecure mothers.
Keywords: reflective functioning, mentalization, mental-state talk, attachment, adolescence
Introduction
The present study focuses on the relationship of the mother’s reﬂective functioning (RF) and her
attachment security with her preadolescent children’s ability to mentalize.
Mentalizing refers to the capacity to perceive and understand oneself and others in terms of
mental states (feelings, beliefs, intentions, and desires) as well as the ability to reason about one’s
own and others’ behavior in terms of mental states (Fonagy et al., 1998).
Fonagy et al. (1998) introduced the concept of mentalization, operationalized as RF in the wake
of studies conducted on the “theory of mind” (ToM) within the domain of cognitive psychology
(e.g., Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). His research and theoretical assumptions focused mainly on
the development of mentalization and individual diﬀerences, expanding the concept beyond false
beliefs, autism, and childhood (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Perner et al., 1989).
According to Fonagy et al. (1998), mentalization is necessary for good social adjustment because
it allows one to represent causal mental states, discriminate internal, and external realities, infer
other’s mental states from behavioral and contextual clues and regulate behavior and emotional
experience.
In this perspective, mentalization is a protective factor for the individual and one’s social
development. Consistent with this standpoint, many studies have found deﬁcits in mentalization
ability in psychopathological conditions (Bateman and Fonagy, 2004; Fonagy and Bateman, 2008;
Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2010; Fonagy et al., 2011; Sharp et al., 2011). Similarly, satisfactory
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mentalization ability was found to be protective against the
development of psychopathology (Sharp et al., 2006; Ostler et al.,
2010).
The development of mentalization critically depends upon
interpersonal experiences and speciﬁcally upon interactions
with more mature minds, assuming these interactions are
benign, reﬂective, and suﬃciently attuned (Fonagy, 2006).
Actually, mentalization deﬁcits have been found in individuals
who experienced abuse. For instance, abused children showed
developmental delay in emotion-understanding processes (Frodi
and Smetana, 1984; Smith and Walden, 1999) and in the
performance of ToM tasks (Cicchetti et al., 2003; Pears and
Fischler, 2005), independent of their intellectual level and
socioeconomic condition. Likewise, traumatized children found
it diﬃcult to learn an emotional lexicon (Beeghly and Cicchetti,
1994) just as adults who were abused as children exhibited deﬁcits
in the ability to recognize facial expressions (Fonagy et al., 2003).
Currently, it is thought that maternal mentalization allows
children to develop their mentalization capacity through the
mother’s ability to regulate the child’s aﬀective state, especially
in moments of increased arousal. Mothers who respond to their
children’s aﬀective displays with contingent marked aﬀective
displays of their own allow their babies to modulate their own
aﬀective states; this process is thought to be especially important
in the modulation of negative emotions (Fonagy et al., 2002)
because it permits the child to not activate an attachment
system that would deactivate the mentalization system (Fonagy,
2006; Fonagy and Target, 2008). Recent neuroimaging studies
have supported this hypothesis (Bartels and Zeki, 2000, 2004),
demonstrating that the activation of attachment system-related
brain areas deactivates mentalization-related brain areas.
Mothers who are able to mentalize the aﬀective states of
their children help them to develop their own abilities to
regulate emotions, which in turn permit them to process
emotional stimuli without defensively avoiding them or feeling
overwhelmed.Maternal mentalization allows the child to adapt to
aﬀective states without being destabilized and to experience and
recognize the aﬀect that he/she feels. This experience permits the
development of the child’s ability to know the subjective meaning
of his/her feelings beyond a mere intellectual understanding.
It also promotes the ability to acquire “mentalized aﬀectivity,”
which would allow the child to feel thoughts and think about
feelings (Jurist, 2005).
Although many studies have investigated the relationship
between the mother’s mentalizing ability and the child’s
attachment security, very few empirical studies have addressed
maternal inﬂuences on the child’s actual mentalizing ability.
The latter focused on: (1) the relationship between the mother’s
attachment security and the child’s mentalization, and (2) the
relationship between the mother’s mentalization and the child’s
ability to understand emotions and solve ToM tasks.
The mother’s security with respect to her own childhood
experiences has been shown to be predictive of her child’s
ability to recognize painful feelings and face diﬃcult situations
(Steele et al., 2002), understand emotions, especially negative
ones (Laible and Thompson, 1998; Steele et al., 1999, 2003, 2008),
and solve false-belief tasks (Fonagy et al., 1997).
However, only a few empirical studies, generally limited
to preschool-aged children, have investigated the relationship
between the mother’s and child’s mentalization abilities. Meins
et al. (2002, 2003), for example, observed a positive correlation
between a mother’s “mind-mindedness,” deﬁned as the mother’s
ability to interpret the child’s internal states accurately, and
her 4-year-old child’s performance on a battery of ToM tasks.
Other studies have shown positive correlations between a child’s
performance onHarris (1989) belief-desire ToM tasks, a maternal
proclivity to describe children in mentalistic terms (Meins et al.,
1998), and maternal RF (Steele and Steele, 2008).
Some studies have focused on the maternal tendency to
face painful emotional states. Consistent with Fonagy et al.’s
(2002) hypothesis, the maternal ability to talk about negative
emotions has been shown to be predictive of the ability to
understand emotions (Dunn and Brown, 2001) and of the
early acquisition of ToM (Hughes and Dunn, 2002). A child’s
tendency to avoid recognizing and facing negative emotions
has been negatively correlated with the maternal ability to
understand the child’s mind (Sharp et al., 2006), and more
frequent maternal mental-state talk about positive feelings was
found to be associated with less maternal RF and sensitivity to
child needs (Borelli et al., 2012). Another study demonstrated
that family dialog involving negative emotions was predictive of
better performance on tests of understanding emotions (Dunn
and Brown, 2001). Regarding maternal attachment patterns,
an association between dismissive attachment and deﬁcits in
processing negative emotions was observed. Speciﬁcally, recent
neuroimaging studies demonstrated that dismissive mothers are
not able to process sadness (Strathearn et al., 2009) and inhibit
negative aﬀective responses (Leckman et al., 2004; Strathearn,
2006; Crittenden, 2008). Therefore, these mothers cannot mirror
these same emotions in their children.
Up to now the relationship between maternal and childhood
mentalization during early adolescence is understudied in that
most research has focused on pre-school children. To the best of
our knowledge, only one study (Benbassat and Priel, 2012) has
investigated the role of parental RF on adolescent adjustment;
it found that parental RF correlated with adolescent RF and
social competence in a sample of adolescents aged 14–18 years.
The impact of maternal attachment security on child mentalizing
ability has also been investigated only in childhood.
During early adolescence, mentalizing abilities increase
(Choudhury et al., 2006; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Goldstein and
Winner, 2012; Valle et al., 2015) concurrently with other cognitive
changes, such as understanding the concepts of possibility and
logical necessity (Piéraut-Le Bonniec, 1980). Bosco et al. (2014)
noted that the development of ToM is particularly consistent
between ages 11 and 13 years. Furthermore, preadolescence is an
important turning point in the development of narrative thinking
(Bruner, 1986). Between the ages of 10 and 12, there is a clear
shift in plot structure and in the interpretative understanding of
human actions (Genereux and McKeough, 2007).
Investigations into the relationships among maternal
mentalization, attachment security and mentalization in
preadolescent children could aid in the design of preventive and
therapeutic actions focused on the parent–child relationship
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during this under-considered developmental period. The
importance of parental sensitivity during preadolescence is also
frequently underestimated even though the early adolescent
really needs to be understood as a feeling and thinking individual
in the face of multifaceted developmental challenges, and
impaired mentalization in both the parent and the child may be a
serious risk factor for the emergence of family conﬂict, behavior
disorders in childhood, and psychopathology.
Recent studies found that during adolescence mentalization
is a protective factor against the emergence of proactive
aggression (Taubner et al., 2013) and eating disordered behavior
(Rothschild-Yakar et al., 2010, 2013). Other studies have shown
that mentalization deﬁcits in adolescence have an impact on BPD
symptoms through the mediating role of emotion dysregulation
(Sharp et al., 2011; Ha et al., 2013).
The goal of this study was to investigate the relationship
between maternal reﬂecting functioning, maternal attachment
security and the mentalization abilities of their preadolescent
children.
A previous study on the same dyads (Scopesi et al., 2015)
analyzed the relationship between the mental state talk of
mothers and their preadolescent children, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant
role of maternal RF in children’s mental state talk. In this
study, this relationship was further analyzed by taking into
account not only the overall mothers’ RF but also their speciﬁc
markers of mentalizing as well as the emotional context in
which they mentalized. In particular, four markers of RF were
considered, namely, “Awareness of the nature of mental states”
(marker A), “Explicit eﬀort to tease out mental states’ underlying
behavior” (marker B), “Recognizing developmental aspects of
mental states” (marker C) and “Mental states in relation to the
interviewer” (marker D), (Fonagy et al., 1998). In addition, as
the examined literature revealed a crucial role of the maternal
ability tomentalize negative emotions, we diﬀerentiated maternal
mentalization of positive, negative and mixed-ambivalent mental
states, hypothesizing that mothers who can mentalize negative
and mixed-ambivalent mental states have children who are more
competent mentalizers themselves.
Concerning maternal attachment patterns, this study took
into account both a categorical classiﬁcation and a dimensional
approach, considering both the Adult Attachment Interview
(AAI; Main and Goldwyn, 1998) overall classiﬁcation and
the scores reported by the mothers on AAI’s state-of-mind
subscales. It was expected that mother’s RF would signiﬁcantly
correlate with the mentalization ability in their children whereas
the association between maternal attachment security and
childhood mentalization would be less signiﬁcant; however, it
was hypothesized that a maternal idealizing or derogatory state




A total of 41 mother–child dyads agreed to participate in this
study. The children included 15 females and 26 males, aged
12.3–12.11 years, who were attending the state school. Subjects
were from the working and middle socioeconomic classes. Most
subjects were from intact families (75.6%), and most children
were ﬁrstborns (65.9%). No subject suﬀered from a learning
disorder or any other psychological condition as reported by
the mothers and teachers. Only 59% of parents gave consent
for their children to be administered the Wechsler Intelligence
Scale for Children (WISC)-III. All of the children’s IQ results
were within normal standards (range = 99–140; M = 115.88;
SD = 11.22).
All participants were born in Italy from Italian parents, and
Italian was the ﬁrst or sole language for all of them. The mothers
ranged in age from 37 to 53 years (M = 43.39; SD = 4.66).
Their education level was between 8 and 23 years (M = 13.51,
SD = 3.5), with 34.1% reporting 16 or more years of education,
46.4% reporting 13–15 years of education, and 19.5% reporting
fewer than 12 years of education. They each had between 1 and
5 children (M = 1.98; SD = 0.82). Among the 41 mothers, 39
women (95.1%) reported working full-time outside the home.
Measures
Maternal Attachment Pattern
The AAI (Main andGoldwyn, 1998) was administered tomothers
to assess their attachment pattern. This well-established and
widely validated semi-structured interview takes about an hour
and includes 18 questions concerning childhood experiences
of attachment. The coding system allows the classiﬁcation of
the attachment state of mind into ﬁve categories: secure (F),
dismissive (Ds), preoccupied (E), unresolved with respect to past
loss or trauma (U), Cannot Classify (CC).
Because of the sample size in this study, analyses based
on attachment pattern classiﬁcations were conducted using
the standard secure-versus-insecure (Dismissive, Preoccupied,
Unresolved, and Cannot Classify) categorization. Moreover, as
suggested by Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn (2009),
a dimensional approach to AAI data was used in addition to
the categorical system. To explore the relationships between
speciﬁc dimensions of maternal attachment representations and
the mentalizing abilities of their children, this study took
into account the following continuous rating scales of the
AAI transcripts: “Idealization regarding mother,” “Idealization
regarding father,” “Derogation regarding mother,” “Derogation
regarding father,” “Overall derogation of attachment,” “Insistence
on lack of recall,” “Involving anger,” “Passivity of thought
processes,” and “Coherence of the transcript.”
All of the AAIs were coded in terms of the Berkeley AAI
System (Main and Goldwyn, 1998) by the ﬁrst author. Ten
randomly selected AAIs were then re-coded by an independent
coder. The resulting inter-rater reliability was excellent (Cohen’s
k = 0.84).
Maternal Reflective Functioning
The Reﬂective Functioning Scale (RFS) developed by Fonagy et al.
(1998) was applied to the AAI transcripts to evaluate the mothers’
RF. The RFS was designed to use the AAI narratives to evaluate
the capacity for mentalization, namely, “the capacity to perceive
and understand oneself and others in terms of mental states” and
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1134
Rosso et al. Reflective functioning, attachment and preadolescent mentalization
“the capacity to reason about one’s own and others’ behavior in
terms of mental states” (Fonagy et al., 1998, p.7).
In the AAI protocol, some questions require a RF (e.g., “Why
do you think your parents behaved as they did during your
childhood?”), while others merely permit it (e.g., “Could you
describe your ﬁrst separation from your parents?”).
According to the RFS scoring guidelines, there are four
markers of reﬂecting functioning: “Awareness of the nature
of mental states” (marker A), “Explicit eﬀort to tease out
mental states’ underlying behavior” (marker B), “Recognizing
developmental aspects of mental states” (marker C), and “Mental
states in relation to the interviewer” (marker D). The following
statements are illustrations of RF. For instance, awareness of
the nature of mental states (marker A) could be evident in
the following sentence: “My mother often seemed happy, but
I think that probably she sometimes would not show to us
her concerns,” in which the subject shows that he is aware of
the opaqueness of the mental states and that mental states are
susceptible to disguise. In addition, the explicit eﬀort to tease out
the mental states underlying behavior (marker B) is exempliﬁed
in this statement: “I screamed because I felt awfully helpless,
I was not able to think what to do, I felt really vulnerable!”
An example of marker C is “When I was young I felt my
brother was a nasty boy, now I think he was a very sad child”
(“Recognizing developmental aspects of mental states”) while “I
think that it can be painful for you to have to hear this sad
story!” illustrates marker D (“Mental states in relation to the
interviewer”).
After rating each identiﬁed passage of the AAI, an overall
classiﬁcation is assigned to the interview considered as a whole,
ranging from –1 (negative RF) to 9 (exceptional RF).
In this study, the following variables were taken into account:
the RFS overall score, the frequency of each of the four markers of
RF, and the frequency of the references to positive, negative and
mixed-ambivalent mental states in the context of RF.
The following is an example of mentalizing about mixed-
ambivalent mental states: “When I grew up I became rather
confused about the way I felt about my mother: When I was a
child I felt she was my father’s victim; once I became a teenager I
noted that their relationship was much more complicated than I
thought earlier. Sometimes I thought she provoked his anger; for
instance, when she went out without telling him when she should
come back; sometimes she came back the day after, so I realized
that she had a love aﬀair and I did not know if she was right or
wrong. Sometimes I was sympathetic with her; sometimes I felt
really cross.”
Validation studies of the RFS (Fonagy et al., 1998) have
documented discriminant and predictive validity, good inter-
rater reliability, low correlations with education level, and
no correlations with either SES or age. In this study, no
correlation emerged between mothers’ RF and their education
level (Spearman’s ρ= 0.063, p = 0.695).
This study’s ﬁrst author coded all of the transcripts. A group of
10 randomly selected transcripts was re-coded by an independent
rater. The inter-rater reliability was excellent (Cohen’s k = 0.87).
Both coders were blinded to children’s scores on the measures of
mentalization and mental-state talk.
Children’s Mentalization
Two measures were used to assess the mentalization ability
of the children: (1) a mentalization test adapted from the
measure designed by O’Connor and Hirsch (1999) and (2)
the mental-state talk produced within an autobiographical
narrative, the Child Attachment Interview (CAI). Two
diﬀerent measures were used to evaluate mentalization
in an autobiographical narrative focused on attachment
to parents as well as in an impersonal context because,
according to Fonagy et al. (1998), reﬂective capacity in the
attachment context should not be expected to generalize to other
domains.
O’Connor and Hirsch’s (1999) measure of mentalization
A semi-structured interview was adapted from the measure
developed by O’Connor and Hirsch (1999). This brief interview
utilizes a photograph of a typical school setting in which a
schoolteacher chooses a student from among diﬀerent pupils who
have their hands raised to answer her question. After explaining
to the child that the scene takes place during a lesson, the child’s
attention is drawn to one of the pupils who had not been chosen
by the teacher. The child is then askedwhy, in his/her opinion, the
pupil was not chosen; what the teacher may think and feel; what
the pupil may think and feel; and what will happen afterward.
According to the guidelines suggested by O’Connor and
Hirsch (1999), the narratives produced by the children were
evaluated on three increasing levels of mentalization ability.
At level 1, references to mental states are lacking or refer to
general attributions or stable character traits (e.g., “The teacher
didn’t choose that pupil because she didn’t see him” or “The
teacher didn’t choose that pupil because she shows favoritism to
some other pupils”). Level 1 narratives lack references to speciﬁc
events or situations. As indicated by O’Connor and Hirsch (1999,
p. 261), “the behavior is not considered as inﬂuenced by the
context, and there is no attempt to understand the circumstances
that determine that behavior.”
Level 2 narratives include, at amoderate level of mentalization,
speciﬁc references to thoughts and feelings that clearly indicate an
ability to understand the relationships among behavior, thoughts,
and internal states. A level 2 narrative shows awareness that
speciﬁc internal experiences are linked to a speciﬁc external
context (e.g., “The teacher didn’t choose that pupil because she
knows that he knows the right answer and wants to give other
pupils the opportunity to talk”).
Level 3 narratives are characterized by a more advanced level
of mentalization and indicate second-order mentalizing abilities.
At this level, the presence of recursive thinking or of a more
advanced ability to reﬂect on mental states can be observed (e.g.,
“The teacher didn’t choose that pupil and chose the girl because
she realizes that the girl is very sad and always remains aside, and
the teacher wants to show her some consideration”).
No previous study has shown any signiﬁcant correlation
between O’Connor and Hirsch’s (1999) measure and age, gender,
verbal IQ, or verbal ﬂuency. Signiﬁcant positive correlations have
been found with measures of adjustment and friendship quality
while inverse correlations emerged with a measure of depressive
symptoms (O’Connor and Hirsch, 1999).
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The second author, blinded to the coding of the psychological
lexicon and of maternal RF and attachment patterns, coded
the mentalization measure adapted from O’Connor and Hirsch
(1999). An independent coder coded half of the tests. The inter-
rater reliability was excellent (Cohen’s k = 0.82).
Child Attachment Interview (CAI)
The CAI (Shmueli-Goetz et al., 2000) is a semi-structured
interview designed to assess the child’s state of mind regarding the
attachment to each parent in middle childhood and adolescence.
The CAI protocol consists of 17 questions regarding the family
composition and how the child describes him/herself and
his/her relationship with each parent. The child is asked to talk
about speciﬁc relational episodes with each parent, speciﬁcally
regarding when he/she is ill, upset, or angry, feels neglected
or rejected, or needs help. Like the AAI, the CAI investigates
emotional responses to loss and separation experiences.
For the purposes of this study, CAIs were not used to classify
attachment patterns for that had been examined in another
study. In the current study, CAIs were used to evaluate the
frequency and quality of the mental-state talk in the context of an
autobiographical narrative. A mastery of words referring to inner
states, such as beliefs, emotions, and desires, implies that the child
understands that human beings may have diﬀerent psychological
states. It also shows that the child is capable of representing
these mental states and using them to understand the behavior
of others (for reviews, see Carpendale and Lewis, 2004; Symons,
2004).
For this reason, the frequency of mental state terms has been
considered a good index of psychological understanding and an
important marker of children’s mental state awareness in real-life
contexts (Bartsch andWellman, 1995). Furthermore, as Peterson
and Slaughter (2006) noted, the analysis of mental state words in
narratives allows the exploration of individual diﬀerences in the
use of ToM capacities, especially when the False–Belief test is no
longer informative.
Mental-state talk in the CAI transcripts was coded into the
following categories:
• Emotional terms: every term that refers to one’s or others’
emotional state (e.g., “Every time we met, we had a quarrel”;
“I like company of friends”);
• Cognitive terms: every term that refers to a cognitive process
(e.g., “It is hard to understand”; “I can’t remember what I
did that time”);
• Volitional terms: every term that refers to need, desire or
preference (e.g., “I never want to be on the wrong side”; “I
needed some help”);
• Terms related to skills: every term that refers to one’s or
others’ skill (e.g., “She was very good at persuading people”;
“When I don’t succeed in doing maths, he always helps me”).
Uncertainty markers included uncertain mental verbs (e.g.,
believe, suppose), modal adverbs (e.g., perhaps), modal verbs
(e.g., should), and modal adjectives (e.g., probable, possible, and
likely), (e.g., “Maybe now it’s diﬀerent”; “It’s just because she is
not sure, just for this reason I suppose”). References to terms that
indicate uncertainty can signal one’s awareness of the opacity of
mental states and can be regarded as an indicator of mentalization
ability (Howard et al., 2008).
The following data were extracted from the CAI transcripts:
total number of words produced (verbal productivity), numbers
of emotional, cognitive, and volitional lexicon terms, number of
ability-related terms, number of uncertainty markers, and the
sum of terms referring to mental states (overall psychological
lexicon).
Two independent coders, who had been appropriately trained,
evaluated all of the CAIs with respect to the frequency of use and
quality of the mental-state talk. They were blinded tomaternal RF
and attachment patterns. The inter-rater reliability was excellent
(Cohen’s k = 0.86).
To analyze the richness of the psychological lexicon, the root
types/token ratio (types/
√
tokens) was calculated for the total
number of terms referring to mental states and for the speciﬁc
categories of the emotional, cognitive, and volitional lexicons as
well as of words related to skills. The square root has a mitigating
eﬀect on the impact of the number of tokens; this transformation
is necessary because the number of types increases much more
slowly than does the number of tokens in sampling texts (Rizzi,
1995).
Children’s Verbal Intelligence
TheWISC-III verbal scale was administered to evaluate children’s
verbal IQ.
Procedure
The headmaster of the school sent an information letter about the
research project to 360 families of children attending the second
year of the middle school. Of the 360 families contacted, 46
mothers (13%) agreed to be contacted further, and 41 ultimately
agreed to participate in the study. Both children and parents
were informed about the aim of the study, after which both
parents gave their written consent to participate. Consent to
administer the WISC-III verbal scale was obtained only for
24 children. All evaluations took place at the school. Senior
psychology students who had previously been trained in the
administration of the instruments administered the measures.
The AAIs were audiotaped, the CAIs were videotaped, and then
both were transcribed verbatim.
This study followed the APA ethical guidelines (American
Psychological Association, 2010).
Results
Maternal Reflective Functioning and Maternal
Attachment Pattern
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the mothers’ scores
on the RFS and the AAI subscales related to the state of mind.
Correlation analyses revealed no signiﬁcant associations between
RF variables andmaternal education (r’s between –0.12 and 0.23).
The distribution of mothers’ attachment classiﬁcations in our
sample was as follows: 25 Secure (61%), 6 Dismissive (14.6%), 6
Preoccupied (14.6%), 2 Cannot Classify (4.8%), and 2 Unresolved
(4.8%). Because of the small number of mothers classiﬁed as
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 August 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1134
Rosso et al. Reflective functioning, attachment and preadolescent mentalization
Dismissive, Preoccupied, Cannot Classify, and Unresolved, these
groups were combined into a single insecure group. Therefore,
the ﬁnal distribution of attachment classiﬁcations was as follows:
25 secure (61%) and 16 (39%) insecure. Analysis of variance
revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in maternal education as a
function of attachment security (F = 0.976). Correlation analyses
revealed no signiﬁcant associations between scores on the state-
of-mind subscales and education (r’s between –0.13 and 0.24).
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics of mothers’ scores on Reflective
Functioning (RF) and Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) subscales.
Minimum Maximum M SD
RF
RF global −1 7 3.71 1.6
Marker A 0 4 0.83 1.07
Marker B 0 16 5.41 4.27
Marker C 0 10 1.73 2.32
Marker D 0 1 0.02 0.16
Ref. pos. MS 0 6 1.34 1.6
Ref. neg. MS 0 10 4.05 2.79
Ref. mix. MS 0 9 1.15 2.24
AAI scales
Idealization regarding mother 1 7 2.63 1.63
Idealization regarding father 1 6 2.38 1.54
Derogation regarding mother 1 8 1.79 1.78
Derogation regarding father 1 9 1.46 1.52
Overall derogation of attachment 1 9 2.07 1.93
Insistence on lack of recall 1 5 1.61 0.95
Involving anger regarding mother 1 9 2.12 2.28
Involving anger regarding father 1 8 1.61 1.64
Passivity of thought processes 1 8 2.94 1.90
Coherence of the transcript 3 8.5 5.73 1.56
Coherence of mind 3 8.5 5.73 1.56
Marker A, Awareness of the nature of mental states; Marker B, Explicit effort
to tease out the mental states underlying behavior; Marker C, Recognizing
developmental aspects of mental states; Marker D, Mental states in relation to
the interviewer; Ref. pos. MS, references to positive mental states; Ref. neg. MS,
Reference to negative mental states; Ref. mix MS, Reference to mixed-ambivalent
mental states.
Mann–Whitney U comparisons revealed signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in RF variables between secure and insecure
mothers (Table 2). Speciﬁcally, securely attached mothers
reported higher overall RF scores in addition to higher scores
on all of the other markers of RF except for marker D (“Mental
states in relation to interviewer”). They also reported more
frequent references both to positive and negative mental states.
No signiﬁcant diﬀerence emerged in the frequencies of references
to mixed-ambivalent mental states as a function of attachment
security.
Correlations analyses revealed signiﬁcant associations
between RF variables and scores on AAI state-of-mind subscales
(Table 3). In particular, the Coherence subscale of the transcript
(CT) correlated positively with most RF variables except for
the marker D score and references to mixed-ambivalent mental
states.With regard to the other AAI subscales, Overall derogation
of attachment (OD) and Insistence on lack of recall (ILR) showed
a more consistent pattern of signiﬁcant association with diﬀerent
RF variables than did the other scales. The marker D score and
references to mixed-ambivalent mental states did not correlate
with any AAI subscales.
Children’s Mentalization and Mental-State Talk
Based on the test adapted from O’Connor and Hirsch (1999)
11 children (26.8%) showed a low level of mentalization while
24 children (58.5%) showed ordinary and six children (14.6%)
showed high levels of mentalization. Analyses of variance
revealed no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in mothers’ education (df = 2;
F = 0.641) and children’s verbal IQ. (df = 2; F = 1.502) as a
function of children mentalization. Chi-square analysis revealed
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between boys and girls in levels of
mentalization (χ2 = 0.35; df = 1; p = 0.55).
Regarding the children’s mental-state talk in the CAI
narratives, correlation analyses revealed no signiﬁcant
associations with either maternal education (r’s between –
0.064 and 0.25) or children’s verbal IQ. (r’s ranged from –0.027
to 0.16). A higher frequency in the use of markers of uncertainty
was found in girls (F = 8.304; p = 0.006). No other signiﬁcant
gender diﬀerences emerged regarding the use of mental-state
talk.
TABLE 2 | Comparisons between insecure and secure mothers on RF scores.
Insecure mothers N = 16 Secure mothers N = 25
M SD M SD Z p
RF global 2.56 1.21 4.44 1.39 −3.741 <0.0001
Marker A 0.38 0.72 1.12 1.17 −2.228 0.026
Marker B 2.94 3.42 7.00 4.04 −3.382 0.001
Marker C 0.75 1.00 2.36 2.71 −2.120 0.034
Marker D 0 0 0.04 0.20 −.800 n.s.
Ref. pos. MS 0.31 0.48 2 1.73 −3.556 <0.0001
Ref. neg. MS 2.69 2.44 4.92 2.69 −2.542 0.011
Ref. mix. MS 0.69 1.70 1.44 2.52 −1.345 n.s.
Marker A, Awareness of the nature of mental states; Marker B, Explicit effort to tease out the mental states underlying behavior; Marker C, Recognizing developmental
aspects of mental states; Marker D, Mental states in relation to the interviewer; Ref. pos. MS, references to positive mental states; Ref. neg. MS, Reference to negative
mental states; Ref. mix MS, Reference to mixed-ambivalent mental states.
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TABLE 3 | Spearman correlation coefficients between maternal scores on the RF and AAI subscales.
IDM IDF DM DF OD ILR IAM IAF PTP CT
RF global −0.27 −0.33∗ −0.33∗ −0.19 −0.39∗ −0.52∗∗∗ −0.20 −0.08 −0.31∗ 0.76∗∗∗
Marker A −0.07 −0.01 −0.24 −0.18 −0.44∗ −0.29 −0.33∗ −0.27 −0.09 0.46∗∗
Marker B −0.33∗ −0.24 −0.28 −0.22 −0.45∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.17 −0.14 −0.15 0.61∗∗∗
Marker C −0.06 −0.14 −0.21 −0.12 −0.20 −0.18 −0.28 −0.01 −0.40∗∗ 0.49∗∗
Marker D −0.17 −0.17 −0.08 −0.06 −0.11 −0.12 −0.09 −0.07 −0.20 0.20
Ref. pos. MS −0.10 −0.09 −0.40∗∗ −0.27 −0.47∗∗ −0.30 −0.34∗ −0.34∗ −0.24 0.53∗∗
Ref. neg. MS −0.35∗ −0.37∗ −0.17 −0.09 −0.26 0.46∗∗ −0.15 −0.07 −0.12 0.52∗∗
Ref. mix. MS −0.15 −0.16 −0.18 −0.12 −0.25 −0.24 −0.18 −0.02 −0.16 0.30
Marker A, Awareness of the nature of mental states; Marker B, Explicit effort to tease out the mental states underlying behavior; Marker C, Recognizing developmental
aspects of mental states; Marker D, Mental states in relation to the interviewer; Ref. pos. MS, references to positive mental states; Ref. neg. MS, Reference to negative
mental states; Ref. mix MS, Reference to mixed-ambivalent mental states; IDM, Idealizing mother; IDF, Idealizing father; DM, Derogation mother; DF, Derogation father;
OD, Overall Derogation; ILR, Insistence on lack of recall; IAM, Involving anger mother; IAF, Involving Anger Father; PTP, Passivity of thought processes; CT, Coherence of
the transcript; ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
We also calculated Spearman’s correlations between the
mentalization measure adapted from O’Connor and Hirsch
(1999) and the diﬀerent categories of the mental-state lexicon
(Table 4). Analyses showed that children’s level of mentalization
correlated positively with the emotional, cognitive, and volitional
lexicons, as well as with the overall psychological lexicon.
Markers of uncertainty were positively, though not signiﬁcantly,
associated with level of mentalization.
Maternal Reflective Functioning and Children’s
Mental-State Talk and Level of Mentalization
Spearman’s correlations between maternal RF scores and
children’s mental-state talk are reported in Table 5. The overall
maternal RF score correlated positively with the cognitive,
volitional and overall psychological lexicons and with uncertainty
markers in children’s narratives.
When considering the speciﬁc RF markers, neither marker
C nor marker D correlated with any mental state talk category
in children’s narratives whereas marker A (Awareness of the
nature of mental states) and marker B (Explicit eﬀort to tease out
mental states underlying behavior) were signiﬁcantly associated
with diﬀerent categories of children’s mental state talk.
Maternal references to negative mental states correlated
with the cognitive lexicon, the overall psychological lexicon
and uncertainty markers. Similarly, maternal references to
mixed-ambivalent mental states signiﬁcantly correlated with
the emotional lexicon, the overall psychological lexicon and
uncertainty markers. No signiﬁcant correlation was found
between maternal references to positive mental states and
children’s mental-state talk.
The children’s mentalization level correlated positively with
the mothers’ overall RF score (ρ = 0.32; p< 0.05) and references
to mixed-ambivalent mental states (ρ = 0.42; p < 0.01). No
signiﬁcant correlations were found with any of the four markers
of reﬂecting functioning and with references to positive or
negative mental-states.
Maternal Attachment and Children’s
Mental-State Talk and Level of Mentalization
With regard to the relationship between maternal attachment
pattern and mental state talk, analyses of variance revealed
TABLE 4 | Spearman correlation coefficients between the mentalization






Lexicon referred to abilities 0.29
Uncertainty markers 0.29
Overall psychological lexicon 0.51∗∗∗
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the children of secure and
insecure mothers in terms of the frequency of use of mental-
state terms (Fs between 0.006 and 0.822). To explore whether
a dimensional perspective of attachment security yielded a
signiﬁcant relationship, a Pearson’s correlation analysis was
performed between the diﬀerent categories of children’s mental-
state talk and the mother’s scores on the AAI subscales.
An inverse correlation emerged between the frequency of
use of markers of uncertainty in the children narratives
and two scales of the AAI transcript, namely, maternal
idealization regarding the mother (r = –0.435; p = 0.005)
and maternal insistence on lack of recall (r = –0.337;
p = 0.031).
No signiﬁcant associations emerged between maternal
attachment security and children’s level of mentalization
(χ2 = 4.49; p = 0.105). Nevertheless, all six children with a
level of mentalization of three were children of secure mothers
whereas about half of the children who obtained a score of
one or two on the O’Connor and Hirsch (1999) measure had
mothers with an insecure attachment (45.5% for children who
obtained a score of 1 and 45.8% for children who obtained a
score of 2). When collapsing categories one and two together, a
signiﬁcant relationship between maternal attachment security
and children’s level of mentalization was found (χ2 = 4.49;
p = 0.034). A Spearman’s correlation analysis between children’s
mentalization level and mothers’ scores on the AAI subscales
was also carried out. No signiﬁcant correlations emerged (r’s
between –0.18 and 0.16).
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TABLE 5 | Spearman correlation coefficients between maternal scores on the RF scale, scores from the children’s mentalization measure (adapted from
O’Connor and Hirsch, 1999) and children’s mental-state talk.






RF global 0.23 0.38∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.21 0.51∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗
Marker A 0.32∗ 0.35∗ 0.21 −0.02 0.25 0.38∗
Marker B 0.12 0.37∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.16 0.54∗∗∗ 0.36∗
Marker C 0.12 0.29 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.26
Marker D 0.01 −0.25 −0.15 −0.09 −0.16 −0.17
Ref. pos. MS 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.02 0.23 0.25
Ref. neg. MS 0.09 0.38∗ 0.27 0.07 0.38∗ 0.31∗
Ref. mix. MS 0.35∗ 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.44∗∗ 0.37∗
Marker A, Awareness of the nature of mental states; Marker B, Explicit effort to tease out the mental states underlying behavior; Marker C, Recognizing developmental
aspects of mental states; Marker D, Mental states in relation to the interviewer; Ref. pos. MS, references to positive mental states; Ref. neg. MS, Reference to negative
mental states; Ref. mix MS, Reference to mixed-ambivalent mental states. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
To evaluate the extent to which maternal variables could
predict children’s use of mental terms, we conducted a stepwise
regression analysis using maternal RF global score and the
classiﬁcation of secure/insecure from the AAI as predictors of
both children’s overall psychological lexicon and markers of
uncertainty. The ﬁnal models are reported in Table 6. The
models explain approximately 11% of the variance in children’s
psychological lexicon and markers of uncertainty. Speciﬁcally,
only maternal RF predicted children’s use of mental terms
(t = 2.19, p= 0.034 for the overall psychological lexicon; t = 2.16,
p = 0.037 for markers of uncertainty).
Discussion
Maternal Reflective Functioning and Children’s
Mentalization
Analyses of maternal RF yielded signiﬁcant correlations with
children’s mentalization and all subtypes of mental-state talk
with the exception of the emotional lexicon. The category
of mental-state talk that was most signiﬁcantly connected to
maternal mentalization was the uncertainty markers, followed in
order by the volitional lexicon, overall psychological lexicon and
cognitive lexicon. Therefore, it appears that the predisposition
to use the language of emotional states tout court is less
distinctive of mentalization ability than the tendency to use a
mentalistic lexicon that refers to oneself and others in terms
of psychological agents having their own beliefs, wishes and
thoughts.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that
the cognitive lexicon is an indicator of mentalization
ability, especially when it expresses a degree of uncertainty.
Developmental psychologists have long observed that a child’s
ability to distinguish between diﬀerent degrees of uncertainty is
a sophisticated competence that is reached later in development.
Some researchers consider these cognitive terms to be the only
genuine category within the psychological lexicon (Moore
et al., 1989). The degree of uncertainty expressed in linguistic
production appears to be strictly connected to the RF indicator
described by Fonagy et al. (1998) as the awareness that mental
states are opaque and susceptible to being masked. To express
such awareness, an individual must use uncertainty markers,
including uncertain mental verbs, adjectives, adverbs, and modal
verbs.
Our results are also consistent with previous studies showing
that a mother’s mentalization ability predicts the same ability
in her children (Meins et al., 1998, 2002, 2003; Steele et al.,
2008). However, such comparisons between studies should be
considered with caution, given their diﬀerences in measurement
tools and in the ages of the children sampled between this report
and previous studies.
The current study also aimed to identify which speciﬁc
aspects of maternal RF are most strongly related to children’s
mentalization ability and mental-state talk, with the purpose of
understanding which maternal competencies should represent
the main focus of therapeutic actions. Marker A (awareness of the
nature of mental states) and, especially, marker B (explicit eﬀort
to highlight the mental states that lay behind behavior) were the
most signiﬁcant maternal competencies.
Children’s mentalization abilities and their mental-state
talk were more correlated with maternal competence in the
mentalization of negative ormixed-ambivalentmental states than
it was with maternal competence in the mentalization of positive
mental states, which is consistent with results from previous
TABLE 6 | Relationships between maternal variables and children’s production of mental-state terms.
Children’s overall psychological lexicon
F(1,39) = 4.828; R2 = 0.11; p = 0.034
Children’s markers of uncertainty
F(1,39) = 4.674; R2 = 0.11; p = 0.037
B SE β t p B SE β t p
Maternal RF global 0.134 0.061 0.332 2.19 0.034 0.061 0.028 0.327 2.16 0.037
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studies (Dunn and Brown, 2001; Hughes and Dunn, 2002; Sharp
et al., 2006; Steele et al., 2008).
Maternal Attachment and Children’s
Mentalization
Although no signiﬁcant diﬀerences were observed between
the mentalization abilities of children of secure vs. insecure
mothers, all children with a high level of mentalization were
the children of secure mothers. Using a dimensional perspective
of attachment, it was found that a maternal dismissive strategy,
based on idealization and insistence on a lack of recall, was
signiﬁcantly and negatively correlated with a marker of children’s
mentalization ability (i.e., frequency of uncertainty markers in
linguistic production). Future studies should focus on the speciﬁc
impact of this maternal strategy on children’s mentalization
abilities. Speciﬁc diﬃculties in recognizing mixed and negative
emotions have been detected in the children of dismissive
mothers (Steele et al., 2008).
The results of this study could have been inﬂuenced by the
distribution of insecure attachment patterns among the mothers
included in our sample. In particular, Steele et al. (1999, 2008)
observed that dismissive mothers represented 70% of insecure
mothers, whereas only 38% of insecure mothers in our sample
were dismissive. Another possible interpretation of the absence of
an association between the security of maternal attachment and
children’s mentalization is the older age of the children in our
sample compared to that of previous studies (i.e., preadolescent
vs. primarily preschool-aged children). This result was consistent
with the ﬁndings of a longitudinal study by Steele et al. (2008),
who observed a reduction in the eﬀect of the mothers’ attachment
on the understanding of emotions in their 11-year-old children
compared to their 6-year-old children.
Influence of the Constructs and Instruments
on Findings in this Study
The diﬀerences between this study and previous reports,
related to the operationalization of the constructs and the
measures, permit only a tentative comparison. Some studies
have examined younger children with ToM tests and have
mainly operationalized maternal mentalization as maternal
mind-mindedness (Meins et al., 1998, 2002, 2003). We preferred
not to use ToM tests in this study to evaluate mentalization in
children because many studies (e.g., Bloom and German, 2000)
have observed that verbal false–belief tests require linguistic
and cognitive abilities that do not speciﬁcally grasp all the
dimensions of “mentalization” (i.e., relational and aﬀective
regulation aspects). Interestingly, this study did not ﬁnd
signiﬁcant correlations between maternal RF and education, nor
between children’s mentalization and mental-state talk, that in
turn did not also correlate with children’s verbal IQ.
Previous studies that also evaluated children’s mentalization
using the psychological lexicon produced in an autobiographical
interview have noted that the frequency of a psychological lexicon
in a real-life context is a good indicator of one’s awareness of
mental states. Moreover, these studies have indicated that such
an approach additionally allows the exploration of individual
diﬀerences in mentalization (Peterson and Slaughter, 2006)
and of the inﬂuences of maternal mentalization on children’s
mentalization (Ruﬀman et al., 2002; Taumoepeau and Ruﬀman,
2006, 2008; Mcquaid et al., 2008).
Sharp and Fonagy (2008) highlighted the confusion between
the many concepts of maternal RF derived from diﬀerent
theoretical backgrounds and between the diﬀerent instruments
or measurement tools used to study these concepts. Maternal RF
has only been used in studies by Fonagy, with the aim of studying
the impact of RF on the performance of 5- to 11-year-old children
on ToM tests (Fonagy et al., 1997) and on tests of understanding
emotions (Steele et al., 1999, 2002, 2003). However, RFS has
shown predictive validity (Fonagy et al., 1998), supporting its
use in this application in the present study. However, our study
would have been more complete had we also used the parental
RF-PDI (Parent Developmental Interview; Slade et al., 2004),
which measures the maternal ability to treat a speciﬁc child
as a psychological agent. In fact, it has been observed that
parents manifested diﬀerent degrees of mentalization abilities
relative to diﬀerent children (Sharp and Fonagy, 2008). Moreover,
AAI and RFS are not independent measures. On one hand,
this may present a limitation of the present study, but on the
other hand, it was interesting to explore how diﬀerent insecure
patterns may impact RF. Following a dimensional approach to
AAI, the current study found that involving anger, a marker of
the preoccupied state of the mind regarding attachment, was
inversely correlated with RF in the speciﬁc domain of positive
mental state, while the two diﬀerent dismissing strategies – i.e.,
derogation and idealization – correlated with speciﬁc impairment
of RF. Idealizing mothers resulted not able to mentalize negative
mental states, while derogating mothers showed a speciﬁc deﬁcit
in mentalizing positive mental states.
Concerning the evaluation of mentalization in preadolescents,
we chose to use one assessment measure within the
autobiographical personal context and one within a non-personal
context. Interestingly, the two measures were signiﬁcantly
correlated and neither showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect with gender,
IQ, or maternal education.
Study Limitations
In addition to some of the limitations mentioned above, another
limitation of the current study was that the frequency of the
psychological lexicon, unlike RFS and the test adapted by
O’Connor and Hirsch (1999), did not consider the possible
distorted quality of mentalization. Recent studies revealed this
aspect to be crucial in the evaluation of mentalization ability
(Sharp et al., 2007).
Furthermore, less than 15% of the mothers originally
contacted agreed to participate in the research. Thus, it is
not possible to know the extent to which our sample can be
generalizable and what implications this limited participation
might have had on the present study. Compared to other
previous non-clinical samples (Bakermans-Kranenburg and van
IJzendoorn, 2009), the dismissive classiﬁcation in this study
appeared to be underrepresented in the AAI. In addition, the
study could have been methodologically improved if an on-line
measure of the mother-child interaction had been used and if
verbal IQ had been obtained for all of the children.
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Conclusion
Children’s mentalization was positively correlated with maternal
RF, particularly the ability to mentalize negative or mixed-
ambivalent mental states. These results are in line with studies
indicating a trans-generational continuity of mentalizing abilities
between mothers and their children. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
mentalization abilities between children of secure and insecure
mothers were not observed, although all children with a high
level of mentalization had secure mothers. Future studies should
investigate the long-term impact of maternal RF on children’s
mentalization abilities, especially during adolescence, when a
mother’s ability to understand her child’s mental states could
be an important protective factor against the development
of psychopathological conditions or health-risk behaviors. The
ﬁndings of the present study support the need to implement
mentalization-based treatments for parents of pre-adolescents
and to investigate their outcomes.
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